How does virtue ethics address ethics and morality

What are the extreme responses you could take? These two extremes are vices — the first response is malicious, the second is dishonest. The virtuous response is the mean between these two. The second is to use our imagination. What would we do if we were already a virtuous person? Virtue ethics can remind us of the importance of role models. If you want someone to learn ethics, show them an ethical person.

Some argue virtue ethics is overly vague in guiding actions. Stoicism or sexual openness can be a virtue to some, a vice to others. Is that the right thing to do? For a theory to count as an agent-based form of virtue ethics it must also be the case that the normative properties of motivations and dispositions cannot be explained in terms of the normative properties of something else such as eudaimonia or states of affairs which is taken to be more fundamental.

Beyond this basic commitment, there is room for agent-based theories to be developed in a number of different directions. The most important distinguishing factor has to do with how motivations and dispositions are taken to matter for the purposes of explaining other normative qualities. If those motives are good then the action is good, if not then not. Another point on which agent-based forms of virtue ethics might differ concerns how one identifies virtuous motivations and dispositions.

As we observe the people around us, we find ourselves wanting to be like some of them in at least some respects and not wanting to be like others. The former provide us with positive exemplars and the latter with negative ones. Our understanding of better and worse motivations and virtuous and vicious dispositions is grounded in these primitive responses to exemplars This is not to say that every time we act we stop and ask ourselves what one of our exemplars would do in this situations.

Our moral concepts become more refined over time as we encounter a wider variety of exemplars and begin to draw systematic connections between them, noting what they have in common, how they differ, and which of these commonalities and differences matter, morally speaking.

Recognizable motivational profiles emerge and come to be labeled as virtues or vices, and these, in turn, shape our understanding of the obligations we have and the ends we should pursue.

However, even though the systematising of moral thought can travel a long way from our starting point, according to the exemplarist it never reaches a stage where reference to exemplars is replaced by the recognition of something more fundamental. At the end of the day, according to the exemplarist, our moral system still rests on our basic propensity to take a liking or disliking to exemplars. The touchstone for eudaimonist virtue ethicists is a flourishing human life.

The target-centered view developed by Christine Swanton , by contrast, begins with our existing conceptions of the virtues. We already have a passable idea of which traits are virtues and what they involve. Of course, this untutored understanding can be clarified and improved, and it is one of the tasks of the virtue ethicist to help us do precisely that. But rather than stripping things back to something as basic as the motivations we want to imitate or building it up to something as elaborate as an entire flourishing life, the target-centered view begins where most ethics students find themselves, namely, with the idea that generosity, courage, self-discipline, compassion, and the like get a tick of approval.

It then examines what these traits involve. A complete account of virtue will map out 1 its field , 2 its mode of responsiveness, 3 its basis of moral acknowledgment, and 4 its target. Different virtues are concerned with different fields. Courage, for example, is concerned with what might harm us, whereas generosity is concerned with the sharing of time, talent, and property. Courage aims to control fear and handle danger, while generosity aims to share time, talents, or possessions with others in ways that benefit them.

A virtuous act is an act that hits the target of a virtue, which is to say that it succeeds in responding to items in its field in the specified way Providing a target-centered definition of a right action requires us to move beyond the analysis of a single virtue and the actions that follow from it.

This is because a single action context may involve a number of different, overlapping fields. Determination might lead me to persist in trying to complete a difficult task even if doing so requires a singleness of purpose. But love for my family might make a different use of my time and attention. There are at least three different ways to address this challenge. A minimalist target-centered account would not even require an action to be good in order to be right.

For further discussion of target-centered virtue ethics see Van Zyl ; and Smith The fourth form a virtue ethic might adopt takes its inspiration from Plato. So it is clear that Plato counts as a virtue theorist. But it is a matter of some debate whether he should be read as a virtue ethicist White What is not open to debate is whether Plato has had an important influence on the contemporary revival of interest in virtue ethics.

A number of those who have contributed to the revival have done so as Plato scholars e. However, often they have ended up championing a eudaimonist version of virtue ethics see Prior and Annas , rather than a version that would warrant a separate classification. Nevertheless, there are two variants that call for distinct treatment. Constantly attending to our needs, our desires, our passions, and our thoughts skews our perspective on what the world is actually like and blinds us to the goods around us.

Contemplating such goodness with regularity makes room for new habits of thought that focus more readily and more honestly on things other than the self. It alters the quality of our consciousness.

And good agency is defined by the possession and exercise of such virtues. Goodness, in particular, is not so defined. But the kind of goodness which is possible for creatures like us is defined by virtue, and any answer to the question of what one should do or how one should live will appeal to the virtues.

Another Platonistic variant of virtue ethics is exemplified by Robert Merrihew Adams. Unlike Murdoch and Chappell, his starting point is not a set of claims about our consciousness of goodness. Rather, he begins with an account of the metaphysics of goodness. And like Augustine, Adams takes that perfect good to be God.

God is both the exemplification and the source of all goodness. Other things are good, he suggests, to the extent that they resemble God Adams The resemblance requirement identifies a necessary condition for being good, but it does not yet give us a sufficient condition. This is because there are ways in which finite creatures might resemble God that would not be suitable to the type of creature they are.

To rule out such cases we need to introduce another factor. That factor is the fitting response to goodness, which Adams suggests is love. Virtues come into the account as one of the ways in which some things namely, persons could resemble God.

This is one of the reasons Adams offers for conceiving of the ideal of perfection as a personal God, rather than an impersonal form of the Good. Many of the excellences of persons of which we are most confident are virtues such as love, wisdom, justice, patience, and generosity. A Platonistic account like the one Adams puts forward in Finite and Infinite Goods clearly does not derive all other normative properties from the virtues for a discussion of the relationship between this view and the one he puts forward in A Theory of Virtue see Pettigrove Goodness provides the normative foundation.

Virtues are not built on that foundation; rather, as one of the varieties of goodness of whose value we are most confident, virtues form part of the foundation.

Obligations, by contrast, come into the account at a different level. Other things being equal, the more virtuous the parties to the relationship, the more binding the obligation. However, once good relationships have given rise to obligations, those obligations take on a life of their own. Their bindingness is not traced directly to considerations of goodness.

Rather, they are determined by the expectations of the parties and the demands of the relationship. A number of objections have been raised against virtue ethics, some of which bear more directly on one form of virtue ethics than on others.

In this section we consider eight objections, namely, the a application, b adequacy, c relativism, d conflict, e self-effacement, f justification, g egoism, and h situationist problems. At the time, utilitarians and deontologists commonly though not universally held that the task of ethical theory was to come up with a code consisting of universal rules or principles possibly only one, as in the case of act-utilitarianism which would have two significant features: i the rule s would amount to a decision procedure for determining what the right action was in any particular case; ii the rule s would be stated in such terms that any non-virtuous person could understand and apply it them correctly.

Virtue ethicists maintained, contrary to these two claims, that it was quite unrealistic to imagine that there could be such a code see, in particular, McDowell More and more utilitarians and deontologists found themselves agreed on their general rules but on opposite sides of the controversial moral issues in contemporary discussion.

It came to be recognised that moral sensitivity, perception, imagination, and judgement informed by experience— phronesis in short—is needed to apply rules or principles correctly. Hence many though by no means all utilitarians and deontologists have explicitly abandoned ii and much less emphasis is placed on i.

Nevertheless, the complaint that virtue ethics does not produce codifiable principles is still a commonly voiced criticism of the approach, expressed as the objection that it is, in principle, unable to provide action-guidance.

Initially, the objection was based on a misunderstanding. Excellence in virtues is acquired over time. Virtues are different from excellences of nature, such as musical pitch or good eyesight, with which people are born. Instead, the more people practice the virtues and attempt to act as the virtuous agent would, the more virtuous people will become.

It can be seen in virtue ethics that goodness is prior to rightness Oakley, , p. One must have an account of what a virtue is before one can decide if an action is right or wrong. Thus, one must have an account of good before an account of right.

Virtue ethics uses aretaic classificationdetermining whether a trait is a virtue or a vicebefore giving a deontic classification of right or wrong Timmons, , p. The very fact that a trait is classified as a virtue or vice allows for the determination of a right or wrong action.

This paper will later discuss how different varieties of virtue ethics use different approaches to aretaic classification. Virtues will be classified as such because they are valuable in their own right. In this sense, virtue ethics believes the virtues are a plurality of intrinsic goods Oakley, , p. The virtues are valuable in a way that cannot be reduced to a single, main value.

They are valuable intrinsically rather than instrumentally. Virtue ethics differs in this way from other moral theories that tend to be monistic, meaning they believe all goods can be reduced into a single value.

Utilitarianism, for example, is a popular form of consequentialism that believes all good can be reduced to the single value of pleasure Oakley, , p. An action is right if and only if it produces the most pleasure, since that is the most important good of all.

Different varieties of virtue ethics will prefer certain virtues to others, depending on how they define right action. The main advantage virtue ethics has over other moral theories is that it does not fall victim to 'moral schizophrenia' as it does not compromise one's motivations and reasons. First, the problem moral schizophrenia poses, which most moral theories face, must be understood. Michael Stocker identifies the problem, which he calls 'moral schizophrenia', in many modern moral theories such as consequentialism and deontology.

Moral schizophrenia, he explains, causes a split between motives and reasons, so an indicator of a 'good life' is having harmony between motives and reasons p. If one wants to lead a good life one "should be moved by [one's] major values and [one] should value what [one's] major motives seek" p. A moral theory should support personal motives. However, the reasoning in many moral theories conflicts with personal motives.

They require that people do "what is right, obligatory, [their] duty no matter what [their] motive for so acting" p. Specifically, the impartialist nature of most moral theories does not allow people to treat anyone else differently. People cannot treat their family and friends any differently from strangers, even though moral intuitions support preferential treatment. Whatever personal motivation one may have to do something does not matter; one must always follow the reasoning of the moral theory, even if it conflicts with his or her motives.

Moral schizophrenia in moral theories will prevent the agents from ever achieving the good life. Stocker explains that these moral theories "allow [people] the harmony of a morally impoverished life, a life deeply deficient in what is valuable A life cannot be very fulfilling if everyone who performs his or her duty very rarely actually wants to. Moral schizophrenia means that, in most situations, individuals will end up discontent from following the reasoning of the moral theory.

Modern moral theories do not allow for personal pursuits such as love, friendship, and community, which are valuable sources of pleasure. These theories do not recognize the value people can bring to lives. Stocker writes "there is a whole other area of values of personal and interpersonal relations and activities; and also of moral goodness, merit, and virtue" p. People's motives need to be in harmony for these values to be realized.

Virtue ethics avoids moral schizophrenia because it allows for virtues that harmonize motives and reasons. Recall that virtue ethics believes virtues are a plurality of intrinsic good; there are various reasons why certain virtues are valuable. It does not believe one overarching principle is the ultimate guide to live by, which generally would compromise other values in our life.

Virtues ethics considers traits such as love, friendship, and community as virtues that are important for the wellbeing of the individuals involved. Specific varieties of virtue ethics will sometimes value certain virtues above others that are imperative to maintaining the personal and interpersonal connections other moral theories do not. NeoAristotelian virtue ethics values what is good for the wellbeing of the individual.

Certainly acting upon personal motives is important for one's wellbeing, so it would value traits such as friendship and love that allow one to maintain personal connections. Consider the following example to help further explain. A man has recently saved up a considerable amount of money in order to visit his friend in Iceland for a week. Instead of spending money on the trip, he could always donate it to a local homeless shelter to help directly feed the hungry.

Surely donating his money to such charitable efforts would produce more happiness than would spending the money to see his friend.

It would most likely be agreed that there is nothing wrong with him spending the money to see his friend. He saved the money himself and would gain personal satisfaction from seeing his long-distance friend. According to utilitarianism, a theory plagued by moral schizophrenia, the right thing to do is donate the money because it would produce the most pleasure. However, think about what the virtue ethicist would say.

The virtuous person would take all the virtues into account. They would consider the virtues of love and friendship. They would most likely conclude that the right thing to do is take the trip to Iceland. The reasons may include the fact that the person would be acting as a good friend or acting in their own best interest by going on the trip.

This decision would satisfy the virtuous person because it harmonizes motives and reasons. Virtue ethics allows people to maintain personal and interpersonal connections important for the good life. Virtue ethics does not fall victim to moral schizophrenia, which is one advantage it has over most other moral theories. After understanding what makes a virtue ethics approach so appealing, some common varieties of this moral theory can be considered.

Care ethics believes that the virtue of care is central to understanding morality Timmons, , p. Most moral theories employ a conception of justice. The self is considered an individual and the primary concern is "to protect individual interests in a manner that preserves equal respect for all" Timmons, , p. Care ethics, on the other hand, employs a conception of care where "the relationship becomes the figure, defining self and others Care ethics seeks to maintain and promote relationships with one another.

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